





Dynamic Risk Assessment of Process Facilities using Advanced Probabilistic Approaches 
 
by 
© Mohammad Zaid Kamil 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted to the 
School of Graduate Studies 
in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of 
 
Master of Engineering 
Faculty of Engineering and Applied Science 
Memorial University of Newfoundland 
May 2019 




A process accident can escalate into a chain of accidents, given the degree of congestion 
and complex arrangement of process equipment and pipelines. To prevent a chain of 
accidents, (called the domino effect), detailed assessments of risk and appropriate safety 
measures are required. The present study investigates available techniques and develops 
an integrated method to analyze evolving process accident scenarios, including the domino 
effect. The work presented here comprises two main contributions: a) a predictive model 
for process accident analysis using imprecise and incomplete information, and b) a 
predictive model to assess the risk profile of domino effect occurrence. A brief description 
of each is presented below. 
In recent years the Bayesian network (BN) has been used to model accident causation and 
its evolution. Though widely used, conventional BN suffers from two major uncertainties, 
data and model uncertainties. The former deals with the used of evidence theory while the 
latter uses canonical probabilistic models. 
High interdependencies of chemical infrastructure makes it prone to the domino effect. 
This demands an advanced approach to monitor and manage the risk posed by the domino 
effect is much needed. Given the dynamic nature of the domino effect, the monitoring and 
modelling methods need to be continuous time-dependent. A Generalized Stochastic Petri-
net (GSPN) framework was chosen to model the domino effect. It enables modelling of an 
accident propagation pattern as the domino effect. It also enables probability analysis to 
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1.2 Overview 
Process safety is a crucial part of all process operations that take place in the industry. It 
aims to minimize the risk of a process hazard that may lead to the release of materials 
and/or energy with the help of preventive and mitigative layers of safety (Health and Safety 
Executive, 2015). However, despite the advancements of risk analysis techniques, they still 
fail to foresee many undesired events in process facilities, for example, the recent 
catastrophic accident at the Texas City refinery accident in 2005 (US Chemical Safety 
Board, 2007) and the Deep-water Horizon oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico in 2010 (US 
Chemical Safety and Hazard Investigation Board, 2016). The Texas City accident was 
caused due to a lack of safety measures that allowed the risk to go above its acceptable 
limits (US Chemical Safety Board, 2007). For the Deepwater Horizon accident, a blowout 
preventer (BOP) failure was the root cause of the accident (US Chemical Safety and Hazard 
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Investigation Board, 2016). These accidents have significantly affected the industry 
practices of process safety.  
The most important step in safety analysis is accident scenario modeling. Various 
approaches have been proposed for this purpose such as maximum credible accident 
scenario by (Khan, 2001) that short-lists the potential scenarios based on the likelihood 
and consequences of the undesired event, the Methodology for Identification of Major 
Accident Hazards (MIMAH) and the Methodology for Identification of Reference Accident 
Scenarios (MIRAS) proposed by Delvosalle (Delvosalle, Fievez, Pipart and Debray, 2006). 
The MIRAS includes a safety system but the MIMAH does not consider it. 
1.3 Dynamic Risk Analysis Evolution 
Risk analysis aims to quantify the occurrence probability of an accident scenario and its 
associated consequences (Crowl, D.A. and Louvar, 2013). In chemical/process industries, 
risk analysis followed by a safety system implementation is important, due to the 
involvement of hazardous substances. Several risk analysis methodologies have been used 
to model accidents, which can be broadly divided into two main categories: a) Qualitative 
approach and b) Quantitative approach. Both approaches identify hazards and estimate risk. 
However, the former approach is often performed for a group of systems, used for 
screening purposes and the estimated risk is relative in nature, whereas the latter is a 
comprehensive approach, used to quantify the risk (probability of failure and consequence 
assessment) and is often performed on specific system or equipment. The quantitative 
approach can be either deterministic or probabilistic.  
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To perform Dynamic Risk Assessment (DRA), many attempts have been made to 
dynamically adapt the model based on new observations from a process.  The two principal 
techniques used in DRA are the Bow-Tie (BT) and the Bayesian Network (BN). Both 
methods have the ability to capture the accident scenario from causes to consequences. 
However, the former suffers from the static nature of its constituents, i.e. the fault tree and 
the event tree. Researchers have made attempts to overcome the limitation; e.g., FT has 
been coupled with Bayesian theory to update the risk dynamically (Ching & Leu, 2009). 
Similarly, ET has also been coupled with Bayesian theory to update the likelihood of safety 
functions (Meel and Seider, 2006; Kalantarnia, Khan and Hawboldt, 2009; Rathnayaka, 
Khan and Amyotte, 2011). Another attempt has been made to utilize the unique features of 
BN by mapping BT on BN (Khakzad, Khan and Amyotte, 2013).  
Moreover, BN has attracted much attention in the past five years due to its unique features, 
such as capturing event dependency, incorporating common cause failure and dynamically 
updating the risk by considering accident sequence precursor (ASP) data often gathered 
during the process. However, it has a few disadvantages, such as a high computational load 
which increases exponentially with the number of variables for constructing the conditional 
probability table (CPT) and an inability to capture complex behaviour/dependency among 
variables, deterministic and/or normally distributed failure probabilities. The current 
research is an attempt to address the gaps and challenges in DRA.   
1.4 Motivation 
In the present study, the application of advanced probabilistic techniques such as BN and 
PN are investigated and discussed in the context of dynamic risk assessment of process 
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operations. The following sections would provide a brief description of motivation as well 
as these mentioned techniques application to bridge the gaps to perform effective DRA. 
1.5 Application of BN in Dynamic risk assessment of process operations 
BN is a graphical technique used to model accident scenarios in chemical industries. It can 
incorporate causal relationships among variables using a Conditional Probability Table 
(CPT). Another advantage of this method is that it models the complete accident scenario, 
i.e., it has the ability to model causes as well as consequences in a single graphical diagram. 
Using Bayes’ theorem, BN has the ability to perform reasoning and update the prior belief 
when new information about the system becomes available (evidence). However, 
sequential updating can also be performed using BN, as new data is gathered from the 
process. The precursor data can be considered to adapt the probability of the system, which 
is of great importance, particularly for rare event probability estimation. 
In the past decade, BN has received a plethora of attention in the area of risk and safety 
engineering. Moreover, BN models can produce results when subjected to model 
uncertainty and/or data uncertainty. The former uncertainty can be caused due to imprecise 
logic relationships used in the CPT to model the causal relationship among variables, while 
the latter results from the crisp probability requirement of BN. Flexible logic gates are 
required to build the CPT; they incorporate various interactions of variables. Traditional 
logic gates such as OR & AND only depict the linear relationships among variables, which 
is a naïve assumption in accident modeling. In risk analysis, the uncertainty cannot be 
removed completely, due to the lack of system knowledge and variability in the system 
response (Markowski, Mannan and Bigoszewska, 2009; Ferdous, Khan, Sadiq, Amyotte 
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and Veitch, 2013). In industrial systems, it is hard to acquire failure probabilities of process 
components, due to the lack of understanding of failure mechanisms and design faults 
(Yuhua and Datao, 2005). Obtaining failure data from process history is not possible for 
all components. Therefore, subjective sources such as expert opinions become the only 
source available to obtain the required information. The data obtained from various 
subjective sources may have a high degree of inconsistency if all the experts do not reach 
a consensus and the probabilistic approach (BN) cannot efficiently deal with the problem. 
Various methods have been discussed in the literature; e.g. see Abrahamsson, (2002); 
Wilcox and Ayyub, (2003); Thacker and Huyse, (2007); Ferdous, Khan, Sadiq, Amyotte 
and Veitch (2009). Ferdous et al. (2009) used bow-tie analysis, where the Dempster-Shafer 
Theory (DST), commonly known as evidence theory, is used to aggregate multi-expert 
opinions, which reduces uncertainty significantly. In the present study, a modified 
Dempster-Shafer (DS) combination rule known as the Yager combination rule has been 
used, due to its numerical stability as compared to the DST (Sentz and Ferson, 2002). 
The aim of this study is to utilize the advantages of BN in the risk assessment of process 
operations and also to overcome its limitations. Incorporating methods to manage model 
and data uncertainties in BN allows modeling an accident scenario more precisely, even 
with incomplete and imprecise information. The incomplete information can be dealt with 
using canonical models which are able to model various interactions among the causes and 
the effects of an accident. Vague information available about the system from subjective 
sources can be combined using the Yager combination rule. The study attempts to predict 
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the accident more precisely because it is preferable to avoid an accident rather than 
minimize its consequences.  
1.6 Application of Generalized Stochastic Petri-Nets in modelling domino effect 
scenarios 
Domino effects are in-frequent but can be very severe in consequences. To model domino 
accidents is a challenging task (Khakzad, Khan, Amyotte and Cozzani, 2013). Since 1947, 
the term domino effect has been documented in the literature (Kadri, Chatelet and 
Lallement, 2013); however, it gained more attention after the LPG leakage in Mexico City 
in 1984. Since then various attempts have been made in the past, based on different aspects 
of the domino effect such as escalation probability (i.e., damage probability), use of 
distance models (Bagster and Pitblado, 1991) and a combination of a probit model and 
threshold limits (Khan and Abbasi, 1998; Cozzani et al., 2006). Moreover, other studies 
used statistical surveys, which show accident sequences and estimate the frequency 
(Darbra, Palacios and Casal, 2010; Vílchez, Sevilla, Montiel and Casal, 1995; Kourniotis 
et al., 2000). Additionally, in the context of quantitative risk assessment (QRA) of domino 
accident modelling and propagation, some work has been done (Khan and Abbasi, 1998a; 
Cozzani, Gubinelli, Antonioni, Spadoni and Zanelli, 2005; Antonioni, Spadoni and 
Cozzani, 2009; Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2010; Reniers, Dullaert, Ale and Soudan, 2005; 
Reniers and Dullaert, 2007; Khakzad, Reniers, Abbassi, & Khan, 2016;Khakzad et al., 
2013;Khakzad, 2015; Khakzad et al., 2013; Khakzad, Khan, Amyotte and Cozzani, 2014). 
Previous attempts to model propagational patterns and likelihood assessments provide 
discrete probabilities. However, those attempts have limitations, such as the inability to 
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model complex process behaviour in combined loading and time-dependent equipment 
failure. In chapter 3 an attempt has been made to overcome limitations in modelling domino 
effects. A model based on Generalized Stochastic Petri-Nets (GSPN) helps to overcome 
the gap. The term Petri-net (PN) was first introduced in 1962 in the dissertation of Carl 
Adam Petri (David and Alia, 2010). This probabilistic technique is receiving much 
attention due to its flexibility to model concurrent, asynchronous, distributed, parallel non-
deterministic and/or stochastic systems (Murata, 1989).  
The motivation is to utilize the potential probabilistic techniques which can model the 
domino propagation pattern and assess its likelihood. The developed framework for 
domino effect likelihood assessment by Cozzani et al., (2005) and Khakzad et al., (2013) 
is considered in the present study to develop a DOMINO-GSPN model for modelling 
accident scenarios, a model which is able to consider heat radiation from more than one 
source and thereby render a time-dependent failure profile of the primary, secondary or 
higher order domino level units. 
1.7 Research objectives of the thesis 
This thesis aims to bridge earlier identified knowledge gaps related to modelling dynamic 
risk assessment and domino effect scenario modelling. The work is conducted to fulfill two 
main research objectives: 
• To address data uncertainty in BN which arises due to a lack of crisp data and model 
uncertainty arising due to the use of linear relationships among variables  
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• To model propagation pattern and domino effect likelihood in a combined loading 
and continuous time-dependent failure profile of equipment. 
The first objective is to improve the BN model in order to predict the accident scenario 
precisely by addressing the data and model uncertainties. The data uncertainty arises due 
to the lack of available knowledge regarding failure probabilities of root causes and safety 
barriers. It is not easy to record all the data of each component in a process plant. The other 
uncertainty in BN is due to the use of traditional logic gates (OR & AND). These can only 
model the linear relationship between the causes and effects. However, canonical 
probabilistic models can overcome the arisen uncertainty by modelling various aspects of 
the interaction of causes and effects. In previous attempts, the data uncertainty has been 
addressed in Bow-tie analysis but not in BN. This study attempts to address it along with 
the uncertainty due to logic gates. 
The second objective is to model a series of accidents (cascading effect) known as the 
domino effect. To model the domino effect is a challenging task because it requires more 
computational time to model complex behaviour of process equipment. From the literature 
review of the current chapter, it has been identified that there is a need for models which 
can assess the domino effect likelihood and propagation patterns. The model should be able 
to assess the likelihood in a combined load, i.e. heat loads from the different mechanisms 
and provide a continuous time-dependent failure profile of the components. It can help to 
monitor the process risk and also in applying the mitigation and control measures. 
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The aforementioned research objective is achieved by adopting advanced approaches to 
the model accident and domino effect analysis. 
1.8 Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis is written in manuscript format. It comprises two manuscripts. The first 
manuscript which is presented in chapter 2 has been submitted to the ASCE-ASME Journal 
of Risk and Uncertainty in Engineering Systems, Part B: Mechanical Engineering. The 
other manuscript presented in chapter 3 has been submitted to the Journal of Process Safety 
and Environmental Protection. The organization of the thesis is also illustrated in Figure 
1.1. 
Chapter 2 is based on the first objective. It proposes a BN based model which is capable 
of modelling an accident scenario when the information is incomplete and imprecise. It 
includes a brief literature review of past techniques used in accident modeling along with 
their deficiencies. The proposed model is first applied to a simple example of a tank 
equipped with basic process control to show its efficacy. Further, a real-life case study is 




Figure 1.1 Thesis organization 
Chapter 3 is based on the second objective. It proposes a DOMINO-GSPN model that can 
predict the domino likelihood of a combined loading and renders continuous time-
dependent failure of equipment. The failure profile can be used to determine the 
vulnerability of a unit. This model has been used with heat radiation as an escalation vector; 
additionally, its application can be extended to other escalation vectors such as 
overpressure, impact of blast wave/missile etc. The proposed model has been applied to a 
case study to show its efficacy. The results obtained from the analysis have been compared 
with other probabilistic techniques to validate the model. 
11 
 
Chapter 4 comprises conclusions drawn from the study presented in chapters 2 and 3. It 
also provides recommendations for future work. 
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 Abstract 
Accident modelling is a vital step which helps in designing preventive measures to avoid 
future accidents, and thus, to enhance process safety. Bayesian network is widely used in 
accident modelling due to its capability to represent accident scenarios from their causes 
to likely consequences. However, to assess likelihood of an accident using the BN, it 
requires exact basic event probabilities which are often obtained from expert opinions. 
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Such subjective opinions are often inconsistent and sometimes conflicting and/or 
incomplete. In this work, the evidence theory has been coupled with Bayesian network 
(BN) to address inconsistency, conflict and incompleteness in the expert opinions. It 
combines the acquired knowledge from various subjective sources, thereby rendering 
accuracy in probability estimation. Another source of uncertainty in BN is model 
uncertainty. To represent multiple interactions of a cause-effect relationship Noisy-OR and 
leaky Noisy-AND gates are explored in the study. Conventional logic gates, i.e. OR/AND 
gates can only provide a linear interaction of cause-effect relationship hence introduces 
uncertainty in the assessment. The proposed methodology provides an impression how 
dynamic risk assessment could be conducted when the sufficient information about a 
process system is unavailable. To illustrate the execution of a proposed methodology a tank 
equipped with a basic process control system has been used as an example. A real-life case 
study has also been used to validate the proposed model and compare its results with those 
using a deterministic approach. 
Keywords: Bayesian network; Uncertainty; Canonical Probabilistic model; Evidence 
theory  
2.1 Introduction 
Chemical process industries are prone to accidents and due to the handling of large amounts 
of hazardous chemicals. Process facilities consist of distillation towers, heat exchangers, 
separation units and various other equipment, depending on the process operation, along 
with a cluster of pipelines. These have the potential to cause escalation, turning small 
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incidents into catastrophic events (Kalantarnia, Khan and Hawboldt, 2009). Such accidents 
can involve fire and explosion which can further lead to a domino effect (chain of 
accidents) resulting in severe losses, including fatalities, property damage and 
environmental degradation (Khan and Abbasi, 1998). Process deviation is one of the main 
causes of accidents in a process system, leading to a chain of events resulting in an accident. 
These deviations are caused due to the malfunctioning or failure of equipment, human error 
and process upset. Among the different methodologies for risk assessment such as 
quantitative risk assessment (QRA) and probabilistic risk assessment (PRA), there is a 
common step known as accident modelling. It is a theoretical framework used to analyze 
the cause-consequence relationship of an accident. Khan (2001) used maximum credible 
accident scenarios for realistic and reliable risk assessments, which help to analyze and 
investigate past accidents and to prevent future accidents by taking into account safety 
measures followed by risk assessment (Tan, Chen, Zhang, Fu and Li, 2014). Accident 
modelling is an important analysis which can help to determine the root causes of an 
accident, enhancing safety systems and developing preventive measures (Qureshi, 2008). 
Al-shanini, Ahmad and Khan (2014) provided a detailed review of accident models in 
chemical process industries along with the systematic classification of each model.  
Among various available modelling techniques, Bow-tie (BT) and the Bayesian network 
(BN) have gained attention in the past decade. BT consists of mainly two constituents, 
namely, Fault tree (FT) and Event tree (ET). The former helps to develop the causal 
relationship between causal factors and abnormal events (accidents), whereas the latter is 
a sequential technique used to identify potential consequences of an abnormal event. 
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However, BT suffers limitations of both the FT and ET, which makes it less demanding 
than BN for accident modelling (Khakzad, Khan and Amyotte, 2013). To address their 
limitations, some researchers tried to couple Bayesian inference with BT (Badreddine and 
Ben Amor, 2010). BN reduces the limitations of BT such as common cause failure, event 
dependencies and multi-state variables which are encountered in chemical process 
industries (Khakzad, Khan and Amyotte, 2013). Probability updating is another advantage 
of BN, which is inherent, due to Bayes’ theorem. The model can be updated if new 
information from the process plant is available which in turn helps to update the prior belief 
about the root causes and safety barriers’ failure probabilities. 
 Methodologies have been proposed to map BT into the BN. Fault tree mapping into BN is 
based on the work of Bobbio, Portinale, Minichino and Ciancamerla, (2001), and Marsh, 
Bearfield and Marsh (2008) used event tree mapping for BN. Later, Khakzad, Khan and 
Amyotte (2013), introduced BT mapping into the Bayesian network by combining fault 
tree and event tree mapping methodologies. They applied BN to assess risk associated with 
vapour ignition accidents, considering event dependencies and used ASP (accident 
sequence precursor) data to dynamically update the probabilities for possible consequences 
and root causes. Yuan, Khakzad, Khan and Amyotte, (2015) applied BN to assess the risk 
of dust explosion considering root causes, dependencies and common cause failures. 
Abimbola, Khan, Khakzad and Butt, (2015) used BN considering dependencies in the 
pressure-drilling technique to update the belief for operational data. Recently, Adedigba, 
Khan and Yang, (2016) developed the model of non-linear interaction of contributory 
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accident factors due to the flexibility of BN to accommodate relaxation assumptions in 
conditional dependence.  
A risk is a function of accident probability and consequences associated with it. The present 
study focuses on improving prediction of accident probability because it is more viable to 
prevent accident rather than minimizing its consequences. The main objective of this study 
is to handle the uncertainty caused by imprecise logic relationships and incomplete (partial 
ignorance) prior data in accident modelling. The model and data uncertainties can be 
addressed using canonical probabilistic models and evidence theory. Traditionally, a linear 
relationship between causal factors is assumed and represented using OR (AND) logic 
gates. Flexible logic gates are needed to build the conditional dependencies that incorporate 
the various interactions of a cause-effect relationship. Canonical probabilistic models are 
used define the conditional dependence between the parent node and child node in BN. It 
can also consider expert opinion (if data is unavailable) or available data, which includes 
various interactions between child and parent nodes. In the current study, Noisy-OR and 
leaky Noisy-AND logic gates have been taken into consideration in place of OR and AND 
logic gates. The implementation of these logic gates is illustrated in detail using an example 
in section 3.  
While performing risk analysis, it is not possible to rule out uncertainty completely because 
it arises due to lack of knowledge about the system and the physical variability of a system 
response (Markowski, Mannan and Bigoszewska, 2009; Ferdous, Khan, Sadiq, Amyotte 
and Veitch, (2013). The prior failure probabilities of basic events and safety barriers are 
not often found in the literature. Therefore, one has to rely on subjective sources (e.g., 
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experts’ opinions). The probabilities obtained from different experts suffer from the 
limitations of inconsistency, limited knowledge about the system, lack of understanding of 
failure mechanism and inability of the experts to reach a consensus. BN is not able to deal 
with such concepts. Various methods have been discussed in the literature to handle 
uncertainties arising from expert opinion and using it for risk analysis, including 
Abrahamsson, (2002); Wilcox and Ayyub, (2003); Thacker and Huyse, (2007); Ferdous, 
Khan, Sadiq, Amyotte and Veitch, 2009). Bayesian probability theory has a well-developed 
decision-making theory which needs precise probability.  
The key question this work is addressing, how opinions (subjective) can be aggregated 
(in the probabilistic framework) to provide a consistent and robust prior and subsequent 
updating using Bayesian theory. Probabilistic opinion pooling is one of the techniques to 
find a consensus among a group of individuals. However, it is widely assumed that the 
combined opinion should take the form of a single probability distribution in case of 
probabilistic opinion pooling which is not an appropriate assumption when dealing with 
imprecise probability. Since each opinion is subjected to imprecision, hence, Bayesian 
probability theory may cause concern in dealing with imprecise probability. Stewart & 
Quintana (2018) has re-emphasized this point in their recent work. The DS theory can 
capture the imprecision in individual probability and also in multiple source probabilities 
aggregation. Use of DS theory with Yager modification provides a reliable likelihood 
estimate in an interval [Bel, Pl] with a median estimate as a bet. The objective of this 
work is to capture the strength of Bayesian network and the DS theory, and thus, to 
provide a reliable and robust means of probabilistic assessment. 
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The evidence theory (commonly known as Dempster-Shafer theory) has been used in BT 
analysis and was found to significantly reduce uncertainty (Ferdous, Khan, Sadiq, Amyotte 
and Veitch, 2013). Dempster-Shafer Theory (DST) is used to aggregate multi-expert 
opinions to define prior belief about a system. The Yager combination rule is a 
modification of the Dempster- Shafer combination rule which has been used in this study 
due to its numerical stability in cases involving large conflicts among expert opinions 
(Sentz and Ferson, 2002). 
The remaining chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 gives a brief description of BN 
and canonical probabilistic models along with DST. Section 2.5 illustrates the application 
of the proposed model by modelling an accident using imprecise and incomplete prior 
information. Section 2.7 shows the partial validation of the proposed model using a case 
study based on a past accident. Finally, Section 2.8 provides the conclusion of the study. 
2.2 Bayesian network  
BN is a graphical model widely used in dynamic risk analysis based on uncertain and 
probabilistic knowledge (Pearl, 1988;Neapolitan, 1990; Heckerman, Mamdani and 
Wellman, 1995; Bobbio, Portinale, Minichino and Ciancamerla, 2001). Its nodes represent 
a set of random variables, and arcs connecting the nodes represent the direct dependencies. 
The quantitative relationship between nodes is represented by conditional probabilities 
assigned in Conditional Probability Tables (CPTs) (Bobbio, Portinale, Minichino and 
Ciancamerla, 2001; Khakzad, Khan and Amyotte 2013). The BN represents the joint 
probability distribution P(A) of a random variable A= {A1, …., An}, based on the 
conditional independence and chain rule. It can be incorporated into the BN structure as: 
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𝑃(𝐴) = ∏ 𝑃(𝐴𝑖|𝑝𝑎(𝐴𝑖))𝑛𝑖=1                                                   (1) 
where pa(Ai) is the parent of random variable Ai and P (A) is the joint probability 
distribution of a set of random variables (Pearl, 1988; Nielsen and Jensen, 2009). 
BN incorporates Bayes’ theorem, which provides a way to revise prior probabilities given 
new or additional evidence. Bayesian statistics measures degree of belief by using prior 
probabilities, updating it by evidence (likelihood) to obtain a posterior belief. The equation 





                                                (2) 
2.3 Preliminary  
2.3.1 Canonical probabilistic models 
BN has been extensively used in accidental modelling of process facilities. However, one 
of the challenges is to acquire the knowledge about the system to develop conditional 
dependencies of child node to parent node. To develop a linear relationship of the former 
on the latter, conventional logic gates (OR and AND gates) can easily be used. In practical 
scenarios the conditional dependence is not always linear which introduces uncertainty in 
the model and undermine the credibility of the process. To relax the assumption canonical 
probabilistic models has been explored in modelling complex behavior in establishing 
conditional dependencies. The canonical probabilistic model reduces the required number 
of parameters to build the conditional distributions. There are various canonical 
probabilistic models available such as Noisy-OR, leaky Noisy-OR, Noisy-AND and leaky 
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Noisy-AND logic gates (Diez and Druzdzel, 2007). These models can use expert opinion 
to estimate the conditional probability of a child node on the parent node. Expert opinion 
helps to reduce the uncertainty in the cause-effect relationship. Therefore, the current study 
focuses on explaining the use of Noisy-OR and leaky Noisy-AND gates in a BN model, 
which better reflects practical scenarios in accident modelling.  
The Noisy-OR gate is used to describe various interactions between n number of causes 
and their common effect Z. The term “Noisy” refers to the chance that causes fail to 
produce the effect, due to the inhibitor preventing it (Diez and Druzdzel,  2007). Assume 
that Ci is the causation probability of a child node produced by the parent node while qi is 
the probability that inhibition is active, in other words, qi is the probability that the child 
node is present but does not affect the parent node. In a Noisy-OR gate, only n parameters 
are needed compared to 2n in the case of an unrestricted model (Heckerman and Breese, 
1996).  Comparing, OR gates and leaky Noisy-OR gates, Noisy-OR gates provide the 
median condition among the mentioned logic gates. Therefore, it has been used in this 
study. When there are multiple parents to a child node, its probability can be calculated 
using following equation (Adedigba, Khan and Yang, 2016).  
𝑃(𝑍/𝐴) = 1 − ∏ (1 − 𝐶𝑖)   𝑖∈𝐴                                                       (3) 
 
The leaky Noisy-AND gate is an extension of the standard Noisy-AND gate in which an 
explicit inhibitor is added with a probability of qL that may prevent the effect Z when all 
the conditions are fulfilled. Each condition necessary for Z to be true can be inhibited or 
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substituted. Let qi be the probability that ith inhibitor is active when condition Ai is satisfied. 
Then, the causation probability, Ci =1-qi. Similarly, si is the probability that the ith 
substitute replaces Ai when the condition is not fulfilled. The leaky-Noisy AND gate 
requires 2n+1 parameter compared to the leaky Noisy-OR gate which only needs n+1 
parameter, where qL is the leak probability which accounts for the factors which have not 
taken into consideration. While in the AND logic condition, the leaky Noisy-AND 
condition provides the median values. The formula for deriving the CPT of the leaky 
Noisy-AND gate is represented by the following equation (Diez and Druzdzel, 2007). 
𝑃(𝑍/𝐴) = (1 − 𝑞𝐿)[∏ 𝐶𝑖  ∏ 𝑠𝑖] 𝑗𝜖−𝐴𝑖𝜖+𝐴                                     (4) 
2.3.2 Evidence theory 
The BN requires the probability of basic events and failure of safety barriers as prior 
information to conduct quantitative risk assessment (QRA). Usually, the occurrence 
probabilities of events are rarely available as accurate data; therefore, expert opinions are 
consulted to obtain prior information. Two types of uncertainties (i.e., aleatory and 
epistemic uncertainties) need to be addressed while using expert opinions (Ayyub and Klir, 
2006). Randomness in the data availability, as well as the behaviour of the system, are 
reflected in the aleatory uncertainty. Vagueness and ambiguity are reflected in the 
epistemic uncertainty, which mainly arises because of incompleteness and imprecision 
(Ferdous, Khan, Sadiq, Amyotte and Veitch 2009; 2011; 2013). Probabilistic methods are 
not effective to deal with imprecise and incomplete information without any incorporation 
of technique which can deal with uncertainties especially uncertainty arising from lack of 
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data (Druschel, Ozbek and Pinder, 2006). To obtain promising results from the 
probabilistic model the prior information obtained from subjective sources must be 
aggregated. 
Evidence theory was first proposed by Dempster (1968) and later extended by Shafer 
(1976), and is commonly known as Dempster-Shafer theory (DST) (Sentz and Ferson, 
2002). The DST consists of three basic parameters, namely, basic probability assessment 
(BPA), belief measure (Bel), and plausibility measure. These pamaters are used to define 
the belief structure (Cheng, 2000; Lefevre, Colot and Vannoorenberghe, 2002; Bae, 
Grandhi and Canfield, 2004; Ferdous, Khan, Sadiq, Amyotte and Veitch, 2009; 2011; 
2013). The belief structure consists of a continuous interval in the form of belief and 
plausibility. The real probability lies in the belief structure. As the structure becomes 
narrower, the probability becomes more precise. 
In a probabilistic framework, the outcome of an event is in the form of true or false. In 
evidence theory, frame of discernment (FOD) is nothing but defines the possible outcome 
of an event {T, F} which lead to four possible subsets. To define the event occurrence 
probability a basic probability assessment (BPA) or belief mass has to be defined. Expert 
opinion is explicitly representing the degree of belief in determining the belief mass of each 
subset. The combined evidence helps to decide the event probability implicitly. Suppose, 
to define an event occurrence probability; the expert opinion would be in the form of 75% 




The FOD |Ω| can be defined as a set of mutually exclusive elements that allows having 2|Ω| 
subsets in a power set (PS), where |Ω| shows the cardinality of a FOD. If, |Ω| =  {Y, N}, the 
power set (PS) will include four subsets, namely, {{ }, {Y}, {N} {Y, N}}, since the 
cardinality is two. Moreover, the cardinality can be infinite. 
The BPA represents the knowledge assigned to the proposition of the power set (PS). The 
sum of all the assigned propositions within the power set (PS) is 1. The elements, i.e. 𝑏𝑖 ∈
𝑃𝑆 with 𝑚(𝑏𝑖) > 0, represent the evidence. The BPA can be characterized by equation (4) 
(Ferdous et al., 2009, 2011, 2013). 
𝑚(𝑏𝑖) → [0,1];   𝑚(∅) = 0;  ∑ 𝑚(𝑏𝑖) = 1𝑏𝑖∈𝑃𝑆                              (4) 
The belief (Bel) measure also refers to a lower bound for a set bi and can be defined as the 
summation of all BPAs of the interest set bi. Mathematically, it can be defined as equation 
(5). 
𝐵𝑒𝑙(𝑏𝑖) = ∑ 𝑚(𝑏𝑘)𝑏𝑘⊆𝑏𝑖                                                                 (5) 
The plausibility (Pl) measure, also referred to as an the upper bound for a set bi, can be 
defined as the summation of all BPAs of the interest set bi that intersects with the sets bk. 
Mathematically, it can be defined as equation (7). 
𝑃𝑙(𝑏𝑖) = ∑ 𝑚(𝑏𝑘)𝑏𝑘∩𝑏𝑖 ≠∅                                                                (6) 
The Bet estimation: 
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The belief structure [Bel, Pl] shows a continuous interval in which real probability lies. 
The Bet estimation provides a point estimation of a belief structure which can be calculated 
by equation (8). 
𝐵𝑒𝑡(𝑃𝑆) = ∑ 𝑚(𝑏𝑖)
|𝑏𝑖|𝑏𝑖∈𝑃𝑆
                                                                (7) 
2.3.2.1 Yager combination rule 
The Yager combination rule is a modification of the DS combination rule. If there is a large 
conflict between expert opinions, the DS combination rule provides unstable results (Sentz 
and Ferson, 2002), first pointed out by (Zadeh, 1984). Unlike the DS combination rule, the 
Yager combination rule does not ignore conflicting evidence. Instead, it is assigned to be 
a part of ignorance Ω. However, when there is less or no conflict, both the rules exhibit 
similar results. In this study, the Yager combination rule has been considered. The Yager 
combination rule uses equations (8-11) to combine the expert opinions. 
{𝑚1 × 𝑚2}(𝑏𝑖) = ∑ 𝑚1(𝑏1)𝑚2(𝑏2)𝑏1∩𝑏2 =𝑏𝑖 , 𝑏𝑖 ≠  Ω              (8) 
{𝑚1 × 𝑚2}(𝑏𝑖) = ∑ 𝑚1(𝑏1)𝑚2(𝑏2)𝑏1∩𝑏2 =𝑏𝑖 + 𝐾 , 𝑏𝑖 =  Ω       (9) 
{𝑚1 × 𝑚2}(𝑏𝑖) = 0,                                               𝑏𝑖 = ∅               (10) 
where {𝑚1 × 𝑚2}(𝑏𝑖)  reflects the combined knowledge regarding a particular event. 
‘K’ represents the degree of conflict between expert opinions, which can be determined 




𝐾 = ∑ 𝑚1(𝑏1)𝑚2(𝑏2)                                                         𝑏1∩𝑏2 =∅    (11) 
2.3.2.2 Definition of frame of discernment 
Two different FODs are defined for the two uncertain parameters (prior probabilities of 
basic events and safety barrier failures). The operational state of a system is usually defined 
in terms of yes (Y) or no (N) for the failure of basic components (Vesely, Goldberg, 
Roberts, & Haasl, 1981).  Therefore, FOD of basic events can be defined as Ω =  {Y, N}. 
The power set (PS) will include four subsets, namely, {{ (null set)}, {Y}, {N} and {Y, N}}. 
Similarly, the operational state of the safety barrier is defined in terms of success {S} or 
failure {F}. Therefore, the FOD can be defined as Ω =  {S, F}. The power set (PS) will 
include four subsets, namely, {{ (null set)}, {S}, {F} and {S, F}}. 
2.4 Proposed Framework 
A generic framework of the Bayesian network has been proposed in Figure 2.1. For the 
model uncertainty, Noisy-OR and leaky Noisy-AND gates are considered in the present 
study. These two canonical probabilistic methods provide a median condition for the 
respective Boolean logic, i.e. OR and AND. To handle imprecise and incomplete data, an 
evidence theory-based approach is considered, which allows aggregating the multi-expert 







Figure 2.1 Proposed accident modelling framework using Bayesian network 
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2.5 Application of Proposed methodology 
 
Figure 2.2 Tank equipped with process control system 
The process considered in the present study is a tank which contains a hazardous chemical. 
The potential hazard is the liquid spill from the tank through the high inlet flow and the 
failure of the process control system. To ensure the safety of the system, it is equipped with 
a feedback level controller which helps to maintain the desired tank level which is depicted 
in Figure 2.2. The Level controller helps to ensure the desired inlet flow into the tank by 
manipulating the A-valve. If it fails to operate, the increased tank level should be detected 
by an independent High-level alarm (HLA) which will trigger the operator to open the 
bypass valve to remove excess liquid from the tank and stop the incoming flow by closing 
the manual valve. However, in the present study human error is not explicitly considered.  
To demonstrate the process hazard in the case above, a Bayesian network has been made 
in Figure 2.3. The liquid spill (CE) outcome is divided into two separate consequences, 




Figure 2.3 BN for “Liquid spill from the tank” 
The accident can be modelled using the framework in Figure 2.1. There are two major 
analyses, namely, accident causal analysis and consequences analysis. In this study, the 
accident causal analysis, as well as consequences analysis, can be carried out step by step 
as follows: 
2.5.1 Accident causal analysis 
The first step in accident causal analysis is the identification of the abnormal event. The 
abnormal event is the undesired, unintended and uncontrollable event which can cause loss 
of property and has the potential to cause further damage if proper safety barriers are not 
employed. The liquid spill is identified as an abnormal event in this case.  Once the 
abnormal event is analyzed, the next step is to identify the intermediate events and basic 
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events responsible for causing the accident. In this case, two intermediate events are used, 
namely, the high inlet flow in the tank due to level controller failure and pump failure (high 
flow rate). Another event is the failure to remove excess liquid which is caused by due to 
HLA failure and bypass valve failure. 
In this problem, the identified root causes are Level controller failure, which is responsible 
for maintaining the desired level in the tank and pumping failure, which causes a high 
incoming flow. Moreover, the High-Level Alarm (HLA) fails to alert the operator to open 
the bypass valve to remove the undesired liquid inside the tank. 
2.5.2 Model Uncertainty reduction 
The model uncertainty due to deterministic logic gates can be overcome by specifying the 
conditional probabilities. Traditional logic gates may not allow construction of a refined 
and detailed model because they are not able to reflect perfect knowledge about the system 
behaviour (Bobbio, Portinale, Minichino and Ciancamerla, 2001). The conditional 
dependence of the child node on the parent node is denoted using CPTs, which provides a 
way to incorporate the canonical models to establish CPT’s. One can condition the variable 
using Noisy gates on most of the possible behaviour of its parent node. This assumes that 
the variable could be influenced by any single parent node independently of the other 
parent node, which reduces the number of required parameters (Pearl, 1988).  
The Noisy-OR and the leaky Noisy-AND gates are used in the present study, both the logic 
gates provide the median condition for their respective logic. Diez and Druzdzel (2007) 
provide details on the use of these canonical probabilistic models. In Figure 2.3, the node 
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“Removal of excess liquid” fails if either the Bypass or HLA fails. It has two parent nodes, 
which means four parameters must be specified. If this were a deterministic OR logic gate, 
only three parameters (equal to 1) would be sufficient. 
In BN (Figure 2.3), the CPT for the Noisy-OR gate is shown in Table 2.1. In the case of 
the Noisy-OR gate, n number of parameters must be assigned to derive the CPT using 
equation (3). The CPT for the leaky Noisy-AND gate (Table 2.2) is derived using equation 
(4), and 2n+1 number of parameters has been assigned. In the leaky condition, one more 
parameter, known as a leaky parameter, must be assigned compared to the Noisy- AND 
gate, which accounts for the explicit inhibitor. 






Causation probability of 
“Removal of excess liquid 
fails” (ci) 
Non- Causation probability 
of “Removal of excess liquid 
fails” (qi) 
1 F F 0.000 1.000 
2 F T 0.950 0.050 
3 T F 0.800 0.200 







Table 2.2 Conditional probability table of “High inlet flow in the tank” using the leaky 






Causation probability of 
failure of “High inlet flow 
in the tank” (ci) 
Non- Causation 
probability of “High 
inlet flow in the tank” 
(qi) 
1 F F 0.001 0.999 
2 F T 0.048 0.952 
3 T F 0.018 0.982 
4 T T 0.858 0.142 
 
2.5.3 Consequence analysis 
The initiating event is the abnormal event which has the potential to cause severe damage. 
The liquid spill is taken to be the initiating event, which can cause more damage and losses 
if the proper safety system is not employed. The liquid in the process system is a hazardous 
chemical which if met with an unknown ignition source, can cause severe damage to the 
process plant. 
The initiating event can be propagated to an end point by considering the working and 
failure of each safety barrier with the help of event tree analysis. If there is ignition, the 
liquid spill can lead to the purely flammable event (i.e. pool fire); while in the case of no 
ignition, a loss of liquid event is considered. It is worth noting that apart from the 
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consequences mentioned above (i.e. pool fire & near miss) another state, known as the safe 
state, is generated, which accounts for the non-occurrence of the abnormal event. It is 
developed by connecting the abnormal event (liquid spill) node to the consequence node. 
2.5.4 Data Uncertainty reduction 
 The acquired input data is subject to vagueness and partial ignorance. To reduce the input 
data uncertainty, the following steps are conducted according to section 2.3.2. In the 
present study, an expert is one who has five to ten years’ experience in the area of Safety 
and Risk Engineering and having a direct and indirect connection with process industry. 
Two expert’s opinions have been taken, assuming each expert opinion is equally important. 
Therefore, to consider both opinions evidence theory comes into play. 
2.5.4.1 Basic probability assessment 
Basic Probability Assessment (BPA), also known as belief mass, encompasses acquiring 
expert opinion to define the likelihood of basic events and failure of the safety barriers. 
Table 2.3 shows the BPAs assigned to each event, assuming that each source (expert 
opinion) is independent. 
Table 2.3 Expert opinion on the probability of events 
Event Expert 1 (e1) Expert 2 (e2) 
{T} {F} {T, F} {T} {F} {T, F} 
Failure of HLA 0.200 0.700 0.100 0.150 0.750 0.100 




Failure of level controller 0.250 0.700 0.050 0.150 0.750 0.100 
Failure of Pump (high flow) 0.050 0.850 0.100 0.100 0.800 0.100 
Failure of ignition barrier 0.100 0.800 0.100 0.150 0.750 0.100 
 
2.5.2 Belief Structure 
The Yager combination rule allows for an aggregate multi-expert opinion from 
independent sources. The Yager combination rule uses equations (8-11) to aggregate multi-
expert opinion. To derive belief and plausibility measures for the probability of basic 
events, equations (5) and (6) are used, equation (7) is used to derive the point estimation 
(i.e. Bet estimation). Table 2.4 shows the belief structure which consists of the belief, 
plausibility and bet estimation of each root cause and safety system. Each term in belief 
structure is explained as follows: 
Bet (bet): In DST, the uncertainty is defined by a probability distribution defined on 2|Ω| 
subset, if a decision has to be made it would be logical. Therefore, there must be a rule 
which can develop a single probability distribution from the continuous probability 
interval [Bel, Pl] when forced decisions have to be made. Hence, a bet is a pignistic 
probability function (probability function in a decision context) that derives from the 
belief function. The bet is often estimated using Generalised Insufficient Reason-
Principle. Most often it is considered as a median value between belief and plausibility 
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probability interval. Smets et al., (1991) provide a detailed explanation and the derivation 
of bet estimation formula. 
 
Table 2.4 Belief structure 
Event State Yager combination rule 
Bel Pl Bet 
Failure of HLA {T} 0.065 0.330 0.198 
{F} 0.670 0.935 0.803 
Failure of Bypass valve {T} 0.006 0.066 0.036 
{F} 0.934 0.994 0.964 
Failure of Level controller  {T} 0.070 0.368 0.219 
{F} 0.633 0.930 0.781 
Failure of Pump-high flow {T} 0.020 0.155 0.088 
{F} 0.845 0.980 0.913 
Failure of Ignition barrier  {T} 0.040 0.245 0.143 
{F} 0.755 0.960 0.858 
 
2.6 Probability calculation 
The deterministic approach is used to compare the result obtained from the proposed 
approach. It relies on a single source for prior information which undermines the credibility 
of accident modelling by illustrating a false impression of accident probability. In this 
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approach, a deterministic failure probability is assigned to each root cause and safety 
barrier in the BN model rather than using evidence theory to aggregate the multi-expert 
opinion to deal with input data uncertainty. The failure probabilities can be obtained by 
available data for a specific process and expert opinion. The availability of crisp data for a 
specific process is itself a difficult task and is one of the main sources of data uncertainty 
in accident modelling. The failure probabilities are assumed to be same and are illustrated 
in Table 2.1 by Expert 1(e1). Table 2.5 shows the deterministic failure probabilities of each 
basic event and safety system. 
Table 2.5 Deterministic failure probabilities of each root cause and safety system (using 
expert 1 opinion) 
Event Failure probability 
HLA fails 0.200 
Bypass fails 0.015 
Level controller fails 0.250 
Pump failure-high flow 0.050 
Ignition barrier fails 0.100 
 
Table 2.6 shows the belief structure obtained by providing the belief, plausibility and bet 
estimation for the basic events as well as a safety barrier. The obtained probability of a 
Liquid spill (CE) and its consequences will be in terms of bel, pl and bet I respectively. 
The combination rule consists of two bet estimations, namely, Bet I and Bet II, Bet I is an 
estimate of a prior probability which is used directly in the BN model by providing the 
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basic events and safety barrier prior probabilities in terms of “Bet”, while Bet II is an 
estimate for critical events and possible outcomes from BN with the help of belief and 
plausibility obtained by BN for a liquid spill and its consequence node. For example, with 
the Yager rule, Bet II for the liquid spill (CE) can be estimated as follows: 
Since the cardinality of the event is two, therefore 
Bel{T} =  m{T}                                                                     (12)     
According to equation (7) 
Pl {T}= m{T}+m {T, F}                                                       (13)       
Substituting equations (12) & (13) into equation (7), the following equation is used to 
estimate the Bet II. 
𝐵𝑒𝑡 𝐼𝐼 (𝐶𝐸) = 𝐵𝑒𝑙(𝐶𝐸){𝑇}1 +
{𝑃𝑙(𝐶𝐸){𝑇}−𝐵𝑙(𝐶𝐸){𝑇}}
2       (14) 
Table 2.6 Probabilities of different consequences using evidence theory and a 
deterministic approach 
Event Yager combination rule Deterministic approach 
Bel Pl Bet I Bet II 
Liquid spill 5.19E-03 3.54E-02 1.59E-02 2.03E-02 1.40E-02 
Safe 9.95E-01 9.65E-01 9.84E-01 9.80E-01 9.86E-01 
Pool fire 2.08E-04 8.66E-03 2.28E-03 4.44E-03 1.40E-03 




In the evidence theory approach, the BPAs are assigned to define the prior probabilities of 
root causes and the safety system. The incomplete and imprecise information obtained from 
different sources is combined using the Yager combination rule, which provides a belief 
structure in terms of belief (lower bound) and plausibility (upper bound). The Bet I show 
the point estimation obtained by providing the bet obtained in Table 2.6 to all input events, 
whereas Bet II shows the point estimation which can be calculated with the help of belief 
and plausibility obtained from the BN model. The information about the system is based 
on a subjective source, the risk estimation is subjected to imprecision if the failure 
probabilities are not precise. Therefore, to overcome the issue it is desirable not to rely on 
a single subjective source. As depicted in Table 2.6, the probabilities obtained using 
evidence theory is continuous in nature which shows the real probability lies in the interval. 
2.7 Case study 
2.7.1 Accident description 
To validate the proposed methodology, a gasoline release which led to a vapour cloud 
ignition during offloading of gasoline at the Caribbean Petroleum Corporation (CAPECO) 
facility in Bayamon, Puerto Rico on October 23, 2009 was selected. According to the report 
submitted by the US. Chemical Safety Board (CSB, 2009), an aboveground storage tank 
overflowed into a secondary containment dike. The gasoline converted to a fine suspension 
in the air (aerosolized), forming a vapour cloud which was ignited when it met an unknown 
ignition source after reaching the wastewater treatment (WWT) area, due to the opening of 
a dike valve around Tank 409. This resulted in a multiple tank fire which continued for 
almost 60 hours and later exploded. The accident resulted in the injury of 3 persons and 
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significant losses to the businesses up to 1.25 miles from the site, 300 neighbouring homes, 
and considerable environmental degradation. 
At the CAPECO refinery, tank level measurements occurred several times during filling 
operations. The operator recorded the level of the tank hourly with the help of an automated 
tank gauging system which included a float and a tape gauge mounted to the side of a tank. 
In addition, an inspector had to check the tank level prior to starting and subsequent to the 
end of filling operations by lowering the gauging tape into the tank. These multiple checks 
helped them to determine the actual amount of gasoline in the tank. 
According to the investigation report submitted by the Chemical Safety Board (CSB, 2009), 
the only level control and the monitoring system, i.e. the automatic tank gauging system, 
were out of service due to the use of an unreliable level transmitter and failure-prone float 
and tape gauges system. Therefore, the level control and monitoring system failed to 
provide an accurate tank level. The overfill time calculation is become the source of error, 
during the gasoline unloading the variations in gasoline flow rate and pressure were not 
identified and considered. Apart from these factors, another potential factor was the failure 
of the internal floating roof due to fatigue, and other factors may have contributed to the 
overfill. 
There was no independent High-Level Alarm (HLA) and Automatic overfill protection 
system. The CSB found that in addition to the lack of an independent overfill protection 
system, multiple protection layers failed within the level control and monitoring system, 
which further contributed to the overfill accident. According to CSB, James Reason’s 
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Swiss cheese Model best represents the accident scenario (Figure 2.4). It demonstrates how 
the level control and monitoring failure led to overfilling of tank 409.  
 
Figure 2.4 Multiple layers failure of level control and monitoring system (CSB, 2009) 
2.7.2 Bayesian network analysis 
BN was developed to investigate the accident scenario and the safety measure’s 
effectiveness. As depicted in the previous example, the same step by step analysis has to 
be carried out, as illustrated in section 3.  Figure 2.5 shows the BN analysis, in which the 
bottom structure shows the causal relationship between the root causes and accident, and 
the upper structure shows the associated consequences of gasoline release with the working 
and failure of each barrier. Table 2.7 shows the intermediate and top events along with 
their symbols used in BN. As gasoline is non-toxic, it has been assumed that any property 
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damage or injuries are due to vapour ignition of overflowed gasoline. Note that the failure 
probability of the sprinkler is influenced either by the Top Event (i.e. Gasoline release) or 
the immediate ignition barrier, which shows the event dependency of the former on the 
latter.  
 





Table 2.7 Events along with their symbols used in accident modelling 
Events Symbols along with Boolean logic gates 
Gauging system failure Gauging_fails (OR gate) 
Gauged level checking failure Gauging_lvl check fails (AND gate) 
Automatic-Tank Gauging system failure A-TG_fails (OR gate) 
Manual-Tank Gauging system failure M-TG_fails (OR gate) 
Internal Floating Roof failure IFR failure (OR gate) 
Tank gauging system fails  Tank gaug sys fails (AND gate) 
Tank level measurement system fails Tank_LM_sys fails (OR gate) 
Error in real time calculation in estimating 
overfill time 
Err_time calc 
Gasoline release Gasoline_rls (AND gate) 
Safe evacuation from the facility C1 
Vapour cloud near tank 409 C2 
Fire+ explosion, less damage in the facility C3 
Pool fire C4 
Gasoline Spill C5 
Vapour cloud near the ground in the 




Pool fire + explosion, moderate damage, fewer 
fatalities or injuries 
C7 
Pool fire, moderate damage C8 
 
Table 2.10 in the appendix depicts the BPAs assigned in modelling the CAPECO refinery 
accident. Table 2.11 (appendix) shows the combined belief structure for the likelihood of 
input data as shown in the previous example. 
A deterministic failure probability is assigned to each root cause and safety barrier as 
illustrated in the previous example. The failure probabilities are assumed to be the same 
and are illustrated in Table 2.10 by Expert 1(e1). Table 2.12 (appendix) shows the 
deterministic failure probabilities of each basic event and the safety system. 
To implement the canonical probabilistic model in BN, expert opinion is considered.  The 
Noisy-OR and leaky Noisy-AND gates can accommodate various interactions between 
child and parent nodes which traditional logic gates such as OR (AND) gates are unable to 
do. It is worth noting that the Boolean logic gates (OR & AND gates) are replaced with 
Noisy-OR and leaky Noisy-AND gates in BN to reflect the accident scenario better. These 
two provide the median condition for their respective logic gates which, therefore, helps in 
further reduction of uncertainty in accident modelling. The Noisy-OR and the leaky Noisy-
AND logic gates help to model every possible behaviour between the cause and its effect 
to establish the practical scenario much more accurately compared with traditional OR and 
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AND logic gates when dealing with real-world problems which render a better prediction 
of accident probability.  
The BN is analyzed using HUGIN 8.5  (“Hugin Expert A/S,” 2008). The probabilities 
obtained from BN are listed in Table 2.8. As can be seen, the probabilities obtained from 
the deterministic approach. As mentioned in earlier example, deterministic approach refers 
to an approach in which one subjective source is considered to obtain the failure 
probabilities of root events and safety barriers. However, in the present study the 
deterministic approach result shows the probabilities of most of the outcome is higher as 
compared to the probabilities obtained from the Yager combination rule. It can be observed 
that relying on a single source undermines the credibility of risk assessment. Hence, if the 
failure probabilities about the system, evidence theory helps to obtain a continuous 
probability interval. Bet estimation helps to compare a continuous interval median value 
with the deterministic approach to show its effectiveness. Bet I and Bet II probabilities 
provide more reasonable results to predict the accident which is related to the 
incompleteness and imprecision of the data. The deterministic approach relies only on one 
source and it has been assumed that the BPA’s obtained from expert opinion is not precise. 
The expert opinion is subjected to limited knowledge. Therefore, if information about the 
system is unavailable it is not viable to depend on single subjective source. In the present 
study evidence theory comes into picture to deal with uncertainty associated to subjective 
sources. The probabilities obtained from the evidence theory is in the form of continuous 
interval and has been forced to a point estimation in terms of Bet I and Bet II to show a 
comparison with deterministic approach.  
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Table 2.8 Results obtained from accident analysis using BN 
Event’s Yager combination rule Deterministic approach 
 Bel Pl Bet I Bet II 
CE 8.97E-03 7.38E-02 2.79E-02 4.14E-02 1.08E-02 
Safe 9.91E-01 9.26E-01 9.72E-01 9.59E-01 9.89E-01 
C1 8.48E-03 4.88E-02 2.20E-02 2.86E-02 9.30E-03 
C2 1.42E-04 3.99E-03 1.34E-03 2.06E-03 1.74E-04 
C3 1.91E-05 3.68E-03 5.47E-04 1.85E-03 1.16E-04 
C4 1.40E-04 4.50E-03 1.13E-03 2.32E-03 9.69E-05 
C5 1.55E-02 1.03E-02 2.53E-03 1.29E-02 1.09E-03 
C6 3.14E-06 8.40E-04 1.54E-04 4.21E-04 2.05E-05 
C7 3.49E-07 7.75E-04 6.29E-05 3.88E-04 1.37E-05 
C8 2.56E-06 9.50E-04 1.30E-04 4.76E-04 1.14E-05 
 
2.7.3 Probability updating 
Another advantage of BN is probability updating given new observations. Through 
probability adapting, the conditional and marginal probability can be updated using 
Accident Sequence Precursor (ASP) data. ASP is information accumulated over time, 
which can be used to revise the probabilities of an accident. It can be in the form of a 
number of observations of near misses, mishaps, and incidents or root events occurring 
during operation of the facility. 
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The US Chemical Safety Board (CSB, 2009), found that multiple overfills and spills occur 
during the operations. According to records, a total of 15 incidents occurred from 1992 to 
1999 among them, 8 were overfills, and 7 were spills and three incidents after 2005 have 
been reported, but the events are not clearly stated, it is assumed that these three incidents 
are overfilling and spills from 2006 to 2008. These recorded observations (Table 2.9) are 
considered in our BN model to predict the probability of Gasoline release and consequence 
C7. 
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Figure 2.6 Dynamic probability changes of the Gasoline release 
The updated probability of “Gasoline release” and consequence C7 are obtained with the 
help of backward inference that can be performed with the help of Bayes’ theorem. Figure 
2.6 shows the dynamic probability of gasoline release. Deterministic plot shows the 
posterior probability obtained from a deterministic approach, which relies on a single 
source for prior information about the system. However, Bet I show the posterior 
probabilities obtained when prior information is given in terms of Bet, whereas Bet II is 
calculated from the belief and plausibility obtained from the network. The year 1990 
denotes the prior probability of the event and the years 1992 to 2008 show the posterior 
probabilities obtained from probability updating at the end of each year. It is worth noting 
that the posterior probability obtained in the form of Bet I and Bet II are converging, which 
provides a robust belief structure. On the other hand, the deterministic approach shows 
slightly higher probability. This can be explained by the prior probabilities being given to 
the root causes and safety barriers obtained from the knowledge of expert 1, which is on 
the higher side compared to the probabilities obtained from the Yager combination rule, 
which combines both the experts knowledge. Therefore, the deterministic approach 
provides a false impression of risk analysis due to the vagueness of the data. 
With the help of probability adapting, one can also predict the probability of those 
consequences for which no information is given. Consequence C7 occurred 2009, resulting 
in crucial property damage, environmental damage and injuries of persons. Figure 2.7 
illustrates that during eighteen years of operation, the occurrence probability increases by 
three orders of magnitude in the cases of Bet I and Bet II, whereas a deterministic approach 
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does not provide promising results due to the lack of certainty from relying on a single 
source. This shows the safety measures of the plant were not adequate, which led to the 
occurrence of C7 in 2009. This accident could have been prevented if proper safety 
measures had been taken.   
 
Figure 2.7 Dynamic probability updating of consequence C7  
2.8 Conclusions 
The current study proposed a BN-based probabilistic model to reduce uncertainty in 
dynamic risk analysis. Evidence theory has been used to address the uncertainty arising 
due to vagueness and partial ignorance of the acquired prior probabilities of basic events 
and safety barriers.  Another source of uncertainty (model uncertainty) is addressed by the 
application of the proper logic gates (e.g., Noisy-OR and leaky Noisy-AND) which are 
able to make the variables conditional on every possible behaviour of the parent node. The 
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accident. The proposed method provides robust results by aggregating multi-expert 
opinions for determining prior probabilities, compared to a deterministic approach. 
Proposed methodology helps in improving the prediction of an accident probability which 
helps in reducing catastrophic events like CAPECO refinery accident to happen in future. 
2.9 Appendix 
Table 2.10 Expert opinion on the probability of events 
Event Expert 1 (e1) Expert 2 (e2) 
{T} {F} {T, F} {T} {F} {T, F} 
Failure of Tape 0.120 0.70 0.180 0.200 0.75 0.050 
Failure of Float  0.220 0.68 0.100 0.100 
 
0.88 0.020 
Failure of Operator 0.100 0.80 0.100 0.001 0.95 0.049 
Failure of Transmitter  0.200 0.75 0.050 0.050 0.80 0.190 
Failure of Gauging tape  0.040 0.70 0.250 0.080 0.90 0.020 
Fatigue 0.020 0.85 0.130 0.100 0.60 0.300 
Turbulence 0.100 0.80 0.100 0.100 0.80 0.100 
Roof submersion 0.100 0.70 0.200 0.200 0.75 0.050 
Flow rate variation 0.020 0.85 0.130 0.100 0.60 0.300 
Increased pressure 0.002 0.88 0.118 0.010 0.95 0.040 
Containment dike 0.100 0.80 0.100 0.080 0.90 0.020 
Water sprinkler 0.030 0.80 0.170 0.100 0.85 0.050 
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Immediate ignition barrier 0.010 0.70 0.290 0.050 0.90 0.050 




Table 2.11 Belief structure obtained from Yager combination rule 
Event State Yager combination rule 
Bel Pl Bet 
Failure of Tape {T} 0.066 0.305 0.186 
{F} 0.695 0.934 0.815 
Failure of Float {T} 0.036 0.300 0.168 
{F} 0.700 0.964 0.832 
Failure of Operator {T} 0.005 0.106 0.055 
{F} 0.894 0.995 0.945 
Failure of Transmitter {T} 0.043 0.248 0.145 
{F} 0.753 0.958 0.855 
Failure of Gauging tape {T} 0.025 0.122 0.073 
{F} 0.878 0.975 0.927 
Fatigue {T} 0.021 0.157 0.089 
{F} 0.843 0.979 0.911 
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Turbulence {T} 0.03 0.200 0.115 
{F} 0.800 0.970 0.885 
Roof submersion {T} 0.0655 0.290 0.178 
{F} 0.710 0.935 0.823 
Flow rate variation {T} 0.021 0.157 0.089 
{F} 0.843 0.979 0.911 
Increased pressure {T} 0.001 0.017 0.009 
{F} 0.983 0.999 0.991 
Containment dike {T} 0.018 0.174 0.096 
{F} 0.826 0.982 0.904 
Water sprinkler {T} 0.022 0.136 0.079 
{F} 0.865 0.979 0.922 
Immediate ignition barrier {T} 0.016 0.074 0.045 
{F} 0.926 0.985 0.955 
Delayed ignition barrier {T} 0.100 0.480 0.290 
{F} 0.520 0.900 0.710 
 
Table 2.12 Prior probabilities of deterministic approach obtained by expert 1 
No. Event Prior probability 
R1 Failure of Tape 0.120 
R2 Failure of Float  0.220 
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R3 Failure of Operator 0.100 
R4 Failure of Transmitter  0.200 
R5 Failure of Gauging tape  0.040 
R6 Fatigue 0.020 
R7 Turbulence 0.100 
R8 Roof submersion 0.100 
R9 Flow rate variation 0.020 
R10 Increased pressure 0.002 
S1 Containment dike 0.100 
S2 Water sprinkler 0.030 
S3 Immediate ignition barrier 0.010 
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3 Dynamic Risk Analysis of Domino Effect Using GSPN 
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Abstract 
The domino effect accidents in process industries poses a severe threat to human life and the 
environment and has the potential to affect nearby facilities as well. Numerous techniques, such 
as the Bayesian network, have been used for modelling the domino effect. However, these 
techniques have inherent limitations. These include the ability to consider complex behaviour of 
process equipment in combined loading and the time dependency of equipment failure. In the 
current study, a Generalised Stochastic Petri-net model is developed to assess domino effect which 
is referred as DOMINO-GSPN model. This model is proposed to model domino effect accident 
likelihood and propagation pattern. The proposed model is capable of modelling time-dependent 
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failure behaviour of the process component in combined loading. The results of the model assist 
in monitoring process risk. A case study is used to demonstrate the application and effectiveness 
of the model. The results from the model are compared with the past study of a Bayesian network-
based domino effect model. This comparative analysis highlights the unique feature of the model 
and its relevance as a domino effect risk assessment and management tool. 
Keywords: Domino effect; Stochastic Petri nets; Risk analysis; Hazardous materials; Process 
safety. 
3.1 Introduction  
Accidents occurring in chemical and process industries are often more worrisome than for any 
other industry due to handling, storage, or processing of hazardous substances under potentially 
dangerous operating conditions (Khakzad, 2015; Cozzani and Salzano, 2004). The word “domino” 
is well described in the literature by Khan and Abbasi, (2001); it is derived from the domino 
toppling game. Many dominos are arranged in a line adjacent to one another. If one falls, it hits 
the next domino, triggering a series of collapsing dominoes. Simply, the domino effect can be 
defined as one thing unleashing the next thing and so on. Authors use many definitions of domino 
effects in the literature. Reniers (2010) and Abdolhamidzadeh, Abbasi, Rashtchian and Abbasi, 
(2011) provided a list of those definitions, and most authors agreed that: 
• A primary event (accident) is responsible for initiating the domino effect. 
• Escalation vectors/physical effects (such as overpressure, heat flux, the impact of blast 
wave/missile) are responsible for the propagation of a first accident to secondary or higher 
order accidents based on the intensity of escalation vectors. 




In a domino effect, a primary unit acts as an initiating event, which triggers the involvement of the 
secondary unit by escalation vectors/ physical effects (Cozzani et al., 2006). The risk associated 
with such an event is of utmost importance because the severity of such accidents increases 
exponentially and the consequences of such an event is more severe in comparison to the primary 
accident (Kourniotis, Kiranoudis and Markatos, 2000). 
Significant research has been done on accident modelling of a single unit in past years, but limited 
research has been carried out in the context of domino accident modelling, due to their high 
complexity and low frequency (Khakzad, Khan, Amyotte and Cozzani, 2013). Since 1947, the 
domino effect has been documented in literature (Kadri, Chatelet and Lallement, 2013), but it 
gained more attention after the most severe LPG disaster in Mexico City in 1984. LPG leakage 
occurred, which resulted in a vapour cloud explosion leading to several other explosions (Li, 
Reniers, Cozzani and Khan, 2017). Another violent domino accident occurred in the BP Texas 
City refinery in 2005, where a vapour cloud formed and ignite, followed by several explosions 
(Khakzad, Khan, Amyotte, et al., 2013). Abdolhamidzadeh, Abbasi, Rashtchian and Abbasi (2010) 
studied domino effect accidents occurring from 1917 to 2009. Two hundred and twenty-four 
accidents have been reported, mostly occurring in process plants, followed by transportation 
accidents.  These accidents increased the demand for risk and safety analysis of the domino effect 
in process facilities.  
Early studies on the domino effect focused on determining escalation probability (i.e., damage 
probability), using models based on distance (Bagster and Pitblado, 1991) and a combination of a 
probit model along with threshold limits (Khan and Abbasi, 1998; Cozzani et al., 2006). However, 
other studies used statistical surveys, which help in understanding accident sequences along with 
frequency estimations (Darbra, Palacios and Casal, 2010; Vílchez, Sevilla, Montiel and Casal, 
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1995; Kourniotis et al., 2000). Additionally, some work has been done in quantitative risk 
assessment (QRA) on domino accident modelling and propagation (Khan and Abbasi, 1998a; 
Cozzani, Gubinelli, Antonioni, Spadoni and Zanelli, 2005; Antonioni, Spadoni and Cozzani, 2009; 
Abdolhamidzadeh et al., 2010; Reniers, Dullaert, Ale and Soudan, 2005; Reniers and Dullaert, 
2007). 
A novel approach has been introduced in the article to model and assesses the domino effect 
likelihood based on Petri-nets. The Petri-net is a mathematical modelling tool developed by Carl 
Adam Petri in 1962. It is a promising tool to model concurrent, asynchronous, distributed, parallel 
non-deterministic and/or stochastic systems (Murata, 1989). Petri-nets consist of two types of 
elements, called places and transitions. Places represent states or conditions, whereas transitions 
show the events. Arcs connecting places and transitions are either from places to transitions (input 
arcs) or transitions to places (output arcs). In addition, the dynamic nature of the system is 
demonstrated by the movement of tokens from one place to another. The position of a token 
indicates the availability of resources at that particular place.  
Section 3.2 of the thesis gives a brief description of GSPN, followed by proposed DOMINO-GSPN 
model in section 3.3. Section 3.4 is devoted to domino accident modelling, using GSPN for 
determining the propagation path and probability estimation. A hypothetical case study is used in 
section 3.5 to show the efficacy of the proposed methodology. The conclusion obtained from the 
study is presented in section 3.6. 
3.2 PN model concepts 
The Petri-net (PN) was first introduced in Carl Adam Petri’s dissertation in 1962 (David and Alia, 
2010). It consists of places which are circular, transitions (rectangular bars), directed arcs 
connecting input places to transitions and vice versa and tokens (black bullets). The places show 
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the state or condition of a system; the presence of a token shows the resource availability at that 
place. The transition depicts the change in state from input to output place, and the PN can also 
model the component dependency. Note that the token can only reside in places, not at transitions. 
However, the direction of the flow of tokens is governed by the directed arcs. Each arc has a 
multiplicity (weight), which depicts the token migration capacity of the arc. The transition firing 
can only take place if the input place has at least an equal number of tokens as the arc multiplicity.  
There are many extensions to PNs, such as timed, coloured Petri-nets that add properties which 
cannot be modelled with the original PN. PNs are widely used in many fields, including process 
industries (Angeli, De Leenheer and Sontag, 2007; Grunt and Briš, 2015; Wu, Chu, Chu and Zhou, 
2010). 
Murata, (1989), provided the definition of Petri-net as a quintuple:  
𝑃𝑁 = (𝑃𝑖, 𝑇𝑗, 𝐼𝑀, 𝑂𝑀, 𝐼) 
𝑃𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖=1, 𝑃𝑖=2, … , 𝑃𝑖=𝑘 
𝑇𝑗 = 𝑇𝑗=1, 𝑇𝑗=2, … , 𝑇𝑗=𝑙 
A Stochastic Petri-net (SPN) is defined as a sixtuple (Talebberrouane, Khan and Lounis, 2016): 
𝑆𝑃𝑁 = (𝑃𝑥, 𝑇𝑦, 𝐼𝑀, 𝑂𝑀, 𝐼, 𝐹) 
𝑃𝑥 = 𝑃𝑥=1, 𝑃𝑥=2, … , 𝑃𝑥=𝑘 
𝑇𝑦 = 𝑇𝑦=1, 𝑇𝑦=2, … , 𝑇𝑦=𝑙 
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𝐼𝑀 = 𝑃𝑥 ∗ 𝑇𝑦 →(0,1) is an input matrix showing the input directed arcs from places to transitions. 
𝑂𝑀 = 𝑃𝑥 ∗ 𝑇𝑦 →(0,1) is an output matrix showing the output directed arcs from transitions to 
places.  
𝐼: 𝑃𝑥 → 𝑁 is the initial marking of places for which the nth component shows the nth number of 
black bullet (token) in the nth circle (place).   
𝐹: 𝑇𝑦 → 𝐹𝑅+ is a firing rate or which the nth component represents the firing rate of nth transition.   
In SPN if a transition is fired, the token wait until the firing delay (which helps to stop the token), 
once the firing delay ends the migration of tokens take place from initial to final place, and the 
number of tokens migrating depends upon the input and output functions (Zhou, DiCesare and 
Guo, 1990). Note that the tokens always reside in places, not in transitions. Transitions are the 
conditions which allow them to go from one place to another. Further, the multiplicity of directed 
arcs must be at least equal to or more than the number of available tokens at the input place to fire 
the transition. This defines the token delivery capacity of the arc either from place to transition or 
vice versa.  
Later, SPN was extended to incorporate the GSPN. All SPN features remain the same, with two 
new features added, namely, immediate transition firing (without any time delay) and inhibitor 
arcs (used to disable the transition when a token is present in input places). GSPN with predicates 
and assertions have been used in the present study.  The predicates or guards are mathematical 
formulae used to allow the conditional transitions while assignments are mathematical variables 
used to update the information if the firing occurs through the transition (such as true or false and 
incrementation). Further, these variables’ behaviours can be used as a GSPN outcome, which can 
be instantaneous, a time interval average or the firing frequency (Talebberrouane et al., 2016). In 
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PN each state is mapped based on Markov process. The firing of token (firing rate λ) corresponds 
to a Markov state transition with probability λ. However, In SP what is stochastic is the firing rate 
of token from the input place to the output place which is governed by probability distribution at 
each transition with firing delays.  
3.3 The Proposed DOMINO-GSPN Model 
The safety system is a crucial part of industrial processes, which aims to avoid severe conditions 
further developing into an abnormal situation. Failure of such a system can directly/indirectly 
affect nearby equipment, causing unexpected process deviations, unexpected work stoppage and 
threatening the environment. To assess the likelihood of such accidents, steps 1-11 describe the 
DOMINO-GSPN model. Steps 1-5 are based on the work of Cozzani et al., (2005); and Khakzad 
et al., (2013), whereas steps 6-9 are based on the development of GSPN to model the domino 
effect. Each step briefly explains the formulation of the PN structure. Figure 3.1 illustrates the 




Figure 3.1 The DOMINO-GSPN model for domino effect likelihood assessment 
Step 1: Identification of accident-prone units  
Based on the available data and layout of the chemical plant, a circular place (P1) is assigned to 
the position of a possible risk source that may generate primary sources of concern responsible for 
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the domino effect. The selected units either propagate a cascading effect or are likely to cause an 
accident, that may include chemical reactors, distillation columns, or atmospheric/ pressurized 
tanks (Khakzad et al., 2013).  
Step 2: Primary units’ specifications 
Using risk assessment approaches such as HAZOP (hazard and operability study) or FMEA 
(failure modes and effect analysis), the event that is likely to trigger the cascading effect can be 
determined. A large amount of hazardous inventory that is capable of producing credible escalation 
vectors along with a high occurrence probability are important to consider when choosing primary 
events (Khakzad et al., 2013). Cozzani et al. (2005) have identified two major causes to be 
considered in this step: low-severity initiating event propagation and major accidental event’s 
interactions. The former analysis should consider low severity events neglected in the safety 
analysis of a plant, such as a minor pool fire or jet fire, which may lead to accident propagation, 
whereas the latter analysis is used when there is a widespread damage from secondary or higher 
order events, and only if those events are major accidents.  
Step 3: Identification of accident scenarios 
This step identifies the escalation vectors associated with each scenario. For instance, a mechanical 
explosion escalation is triggered by a blast wave or fragment projection (Cozzani et al., 2005). 
Therefore, it is essential to know all escalation vectors associated with a particular scenario. 
Step 4: Estimation of escalation vectors and comparison with threshold values 
Once the primary event is identified, each scenario escalation vector transmitted to nearby units 
must be evaluated. Escalation vector’s quantification, such as explosion overpressure and heat 
radiation calculations, can be found in Assael MJ (2010). Based on predefined threshold values 
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available in the literature for each scenario (Cozzani and Salzano, 2004; Mingguang and Juncheng, 
2008), a comparison should be made with estimated escalation vectors to identify potential 
secondary units. Once potential secondary units are identified (escalation vectors exceeding 
threshold values), the unit is considered to be vulnerable. The failure profile helps to ensure the 
vulnerability of a unit in a later step.  
Step 5: Probit values calculation 
Once the vulnerable units are identified, the probit values (Y) can be computed using equation (1) 
from (Mannan, 2012). The calculated probit values are used to determine the distribution, which 
can be used in the DOMINO-GSPN model to provide the failure profile of secondary units. 
where D' is the thermal load, HR is the heat radiation (W/m2), and t is exposure time (sec). This 
equation is developed for human injury but has been modified and used in the present study to 
estimate the heat radiation effect from an external source. To account for heat absorption on the 
outer surface of the tank, factor 9 has been introduced in the original equation as an assumption. 
The introduced factor helps in estimating the thermal load on the outside tank’s surface. However, 
if the original equation is used, it does not provide a satisfactory result because it has not been 
developed for the atmospheric tank. 
To estimate the probit value (Y) for the thermal load, equation (2) is used, where (a) and (b) are 









Once the probit values are obtained, then it can be easily converted into the probability with the 
help of equation (3) (Khakzad, Khan, Amyotte and Cozzani, 2014): 
Step 6: Initial marking of tokens  
Steps 1-3 help to determine the number of places which correspond to primary and higher order 
events as well as escalation vectors, which aims to establish the DOMINO-GSPN model. Places 
can represent each event/condition, while a transition represents a change of event/condition from 
the prior state to the posterior state. Initial marking of tokens is based on prior states of equipment 
and its failure conditions.  
Step 7: Identifying the transitions specification 
Each transition specification (distribution parameters, delay time and probability) will be different, 
depending on the input and output places and these places shows the events/conditions associated 
to the system. Steps 4-5 help in determining the specification of transition if a unit is found to be 
vulnerable using the threshold criteria, the probit values vs time plot helps to identify the 
parameters of distribution by distribution fitting. This step is explained in more detail when applied 
using the case study.   
Step 8: Defining predicates and assertions  
The predicates or guards are the formulae that can be true or false. These are used for validating 
the transitions, whereas assertions are variables that receive the predefined changes; their values 












may be altered as a firing consequence, such as incrementation, and become false or true, 
depending on the condition. The behaviour of these variables can also be recorded as an outcome 
of the GSPN model. For more details about the firing mechanism in GSPN with predicates and 
assertions, the reader is referred to the work of Talebberrouane et al. (2016). 
Step 9: Real-time risk/ failure profiles 
Once the propagation pattern is developed, the simulation can be carried out and the output can be 
estimated in terms of the failure profile for each level of the domino effects. This determines the 
failure profile of secondary unit when the primary event has already occurred.  
Step 10: Identification of secondary units 
Once the secondary unit have been damaged, the potential hazard associated to it must be 
identified. The hazard identification can be done either by identification of significant accident 
hazards (MIMAH) (Khakzad et al., 2013) or the interactions of major accidental events (MAE) 
(Cozzani et al., 2005). Along with these methodologies, one should also consider the type of 
equipment, nature of the release, scale of damage and the surrounding ignition sources (Delvosalle, 
Fievez, Pipart and Debray, 2006; Paltrinieri, Dechy, Salzano, Wardman and Cozzani, 2012). 
Step 11: Next level propagation of domino effect 
At this stage, the secondary units can alter other surrounding units and act as primary units. The 




3.4 The Application of the DOMINO-GSPN Model  
Using GSPN, the propagation of the domino effect can easily be modelled. A simple case study 
discussed by Khakzad et al. (2014), involving four units, has been considered. Consider a process 
operation consisting of four atmospheric tanks. Figure 3.2 depicts such a process plant layout in 
which fire occurs in tank 1 and affects the nearby tanks 2, 3 and 4 due to an escalation vector (heat 
radiation in this case). These units are assumed to be four identical tanks; each tank is cylindrical 








Figure 3.2 Process plant layout, tank 1 where the fire occurs and neighboring tanks 2, 3 and 4 
affected by escalation vector (i.e. heat radiation) 
 
3.4.1 Domino effect modelling using Petri-net 
To model a domino effect, each unit (tank) is represented by a place. Once the primary unit is 
specified (i.e. tank 1), it is connected to other places with the help of arcs and transitions.  The 
DOMINO-GSPN model is applied in section 3. 
20 m 








Tank T2 Tank T4 
76 
 
In this case study, tank 1 is considered to be a vulnerable unit. The accident first occurs in tank 1 
and then propagates to other units, based on threshold criteria. The primary unit is responsible for 
escalating a small accident into a series of accidents. In the case of an atmospheric storage tank, 
the most probable accident scenario is a pool fire, which can escalate and affect the nearby units 
due to heat radiation (Khakzad, Khan, Amyotte and Cozzani, 2014).To calculate the heat flux, a 
detailed explanation and calculation procedure are available in the works of Assael MJ (2010). 
The same procedure has been followed to calculate the heat radiation received by tank 2 and 3 
when tank 1 is on fire, Q1 to 2 = 20.5 kW/m2. As can be seen, the heat received by both the tanks 2 
and 3 are same and exceed the threshold heat intensity (i.e. QT = 15 kW/m2). Therefore, tank 1 can 
potentially damage nearby units (tank 2 and 3), while Q1 to 4 = 11 kW/m2 is based on the distance 
between tank 1 and 4, which is less than the threshold value. However, tank 1 being on fire along 
with tank 2 or 3 leads to credible damage to tank 4. Figure 3.3 shows how propagation would take 
place from the primary unit to the secondary unit. Firstly, tank 1 is in an operating state (i.e. token 
presence in place P1), when leakage occurs (i.e. token presence in place P2) accompanied by an 
ignition source (i.e. token presence in place P3); then tank 1 ignites. The heat radiation received by 
the secondary unit due to the primary accident is modelled using three transitions, transition T2, T3 
and T4, which is discussed in table 1. Further, higher-order sequential level propagation is 





Figure 3.3 GSPN model part of the domino effect propagation from the primary unit (Tank 1) to 
the secondary unit (Tank 2) 
The probit values can be estimated using the probit equations mentioned in step 5. With the help 
of the probit model, a probability vs time plot can be generated, as shown in Figure 3.4. In order 
to use this information in the Petri-net model, distribution fitting has been done. The identified 
distribution parameters are then entered as the respective transition specifications.  
Initial marking of tokens is based on prior states of equipment and its failure conditions. In the 
present case, tokens have been assigned to the operational state of each tank, leakage and ignition 
source. Since leakage and an ignition source are combined, these conditions lead to a fire in the 




Figure 3.4 Distribution fitting on a probability vs time plot for transition T41 & T42 
Each transition specification is provided in Table 3.1. The transition governs the movement of the 
token from one place to another and dictates the dynamics of the model. The time to failure (ttf) 
calculations of a processing unit requires a detailed estimation, including the primary accident’s 
effect on the secondary unit and the amount of inventory (gasoline in the present case). An 
empirical correlation has been introduced by Landucci, Gubinelli, Antonioni and Cozzani (2009) 
based on the detailed simulation results. For the atmospheric cylindrical tank, ttf is a function in 
terms of its volume, (V) in m3 and heat radiation (HR) in kW/m2 received from another source (i.e. 
external fire). The following equation is used to estimate ttf (Cozzani et al., 2005). This criterion 

















𝑙𝑛(𝑡𝑡𝑓) = −1.128 𝑙𝑛(𝐻𝑅) − 2.667 ∗ 10−5𝑉 + 9.877 





Table 3.1 The specification of each transition used in DOMINO-GSPN model 
 
Transition Specification Description 
T1 No time delay Fire takes place when leakage occur, and the flammable 
fluid enters in contact with an open ignition source. 
T2 & T5 Exponential 
distribution 
It is assumed that heat radiation follows an exponential 
distribution, HR1 and HR2 respectively. The propagation of 
heat is a continuous process affecting the nearby 
surroundings. The former governs the heat radiation of tanks 
1, 2 and 3 while the latter is used for accumulated heat 
radiation for tank 4. 
T3 & T6 Delay time Based on the heat radiation received by secondary and 
tertiary units, the delay time includes the time taken by the 
heat radiation to reach another unit from the source and also 
to raise the temperature of the inner surface of the tank equal 
to the outer surface. 




Based on probability vs time plot, distribution fitting 
provides the specification of each transition. The 










3.5 Results and discussion 
The propagation of fire in a four-tank system is shown in Figure 3.5 using the Domino-GSPN 
model. For clarity, Figure 3.3 only shows the propagation from the primary to the secondary unit. 
To model the domino effect, GRIF’s PN module (GRIF, 2016) has been used. Petri nets are still 
in developing phase to become a user-friendly tool. There is a need for a model which can predict 
the domino effect accident scenario. There are commercial tools available that assist in 
developing Petri nets-based model.  The GRIF is one such model used by industry. 
 The Monte Carlo simulation has been carried out from 0 to 30 mins with a step size of 1 minute. 
Therefore, each transition has been defined concerning distributions or delay time, based on the 
discussed calculation procedure and expert judgement.  
The movement of the tokens decides the probability concerning the time at each observed place. 
The failure profile for tanks 2 and 3 due to the domino effect is shown in Figure 3.6. Once the heat 
radiation reaches the threshold criterion, the domino effect starts to propagate, which is shown by 
transition T41 and T42 respectively. Note that from ttf criteria (equation 4), the credible damage 
occurs after 11 minutes. As a result, the estimated ttf can be used to evaluate escalation probability 
based on equation 5, which gives the probability of 5.42 E-06 for tank 2 given that tank 1 is on 
fire. Although the earlier approach was quite capable of estimating the escalation probability, it 
assumes time independence, which is not a valid assumption, particularly in a domino effect case 
in which time is an important parameter to maintain the risk below acceptance criteria. However, 
the proposed method shows a continuous time-dependent failure profile of nearby units, which is 
the innovation of this work; a two-step approach is proposed for determining the secondary, 
tertiary or higher order domino sequence. Moreover, as depicted in Figure 3.6, the probability of 
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fire at tanks 2 and 3 starts to increase at 6 min during the tank 1 fire and significantly increases at 
11 min. However, the former approach fails to provide any relevant information using continuous 
time-dependent analysis. It fails to capture the increase in probability from 6 to 11 mins, while the 
latter approach is dynamic and provides reasonable results when compared to analytical method, 
especially at 11 min, when compared to the analytical equation used in the previous study. There 
is a change of two orders of magnitude of probability from 6-11 min; the former approach fails to 
capture the escalation probability change. Moreover, after 11 min the escalation probability 
increases exponentially, in contrast with the former approach that shows that there will be credible 
damage to tank 2 at 11 min but fails to provide any time-dependent analysis. Hence, it can be 
concluded that the proposed methodology is quite capable of modelling the domino effect scenario. 
This method provides the probability of nearby units being affected at each minute, whereas the 
earlier approach is used to determine the discrete escalation probability. This approach is 
meaningful in determining the escalation probability at each minute, which is essential to 
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 Figure 3.6 Failure profile of tank 2 and tank 3 by the domino effect  
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As discussed earlier, the distances of both the tanks 2 and 3 from the primary unit (i.e. tank 
1) are the same. Hence, the failure profile is the same for both tanks. The results from the 
study by Khakzad et al. (2014) provide a discrete value of probabilities of each tank while 
comparing two approaches (worst case and dynamic approach) using a Bayesian network 
approach, which is widely used in risk assessment  and probabilistic modelling (Taleb-
Berrouane, Khan, Hawboldt, Eckert and Skovhus, 2018; Deyab, Taleb-berrouane, Khan 
and Yang, 2018). However, the proposed Domino-GSPN approach provides a failure 
profile of each level of domino effect, which is used to decide the potential secondary, 
tertiary or higher order of domino effect. Further, it shows how the risk increases 
exponentially with time.  In the case of tank 2 and tank 3 being on fire, their probability is 
the same at each time interval, showing that the most probable configuration of a domino 
event is tank 1 to 2/3 to 4. 
 
















Similarly, if we analyze the tertiary level of the domino effect, i.e., the tank 4 failure profile, 
Figure 3.7 illustrates how its escalation probability evolves with time. Note that at 11 
minutes (ttf), there will be credible damage to tank 2 and tank 3, causing the probability of 
tank four being involved to increase from 0 to 2 E-08, which shows the dynamic nature of 
the proposed model. 
Further, based on the same ttf criterion, it takes 18 minutes for tank 4 to have likely damage, 
given that tanks 1, 2 or 3 are on fire. As depicted in Figure 3.7, at 18 min the escalation 
probability increases to 1.42 E-06 from 2 E-08. The two orders of magnitude change in the 
probability of tank 4 is unacceptable and confirms the vulnerability of tank 4. However, 
the analytical model only proposes the vulnerability of the equipment/process but fails to 
illustrate the escalation probability evolving with time. The escalation probability increases 
exponentially, and as a result, it increases by one order of magnitude from 18 to 30 min of 
the time interval. However, the analytical equation provides a 1.53 E-04 escalation 
probability at 18 min, which is a significantly higher probability for tank 4 to ignite. 
Domino effect accidents are always considered to have a lower probability, and higher 
consequences accidents and any overestimation provide a false impression of the estimated 
risk.  
This study demonstrates that the proposed approach provides a clear picture of domino 
effect behaviour and generates time-dependent results, unlike previous studies. In the past, 
the Bayesian network was only capable of modelling the conditional dependence between 
the events in a domino scenario. However, the DOMINO-GSPN model can model the 
domino propagation pattern which helps in determining the time dependence analysis. 
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Earlier approaches dealt with modelling the propagation pattern using mathematical 
equations, which provided the probability which can then be directly used as a prior and 
conditional probability, which can be used in techniques such as BN. To obtain crisp data 
for the Bayesian network is a challenging task, especially for modelling complex accident 
scenarios which include the domino effect. However, the proposed approach is capable of 
modelling all scenarios and patterns of the domino effect in the probabilistic framework 
and subsequently obtaining the risk profile of each level of the vulnerable unit. Therefore, 
it introduces a robust approach to model such propagation by using an extended Petri-net 
formalism. PN helps to model the propagation pattern by incorporating the firing rate 
regarding continuous distributions and time delays, which helps to model complex 
accidents simply, provided that the accident propagation pattern is known. This model also 
provides the escalation probability of each level of the domino effect with time 
dependency, which is essential to implement safety barriers for managing the risk. 
Although it is a challenging task to model the accident caused by domino effect due to 
complex interaction of components in process facilities. This article introduces a novel 
approach to model the domino accident using the proposed DOMINO-GSPN model. 
Further, if there is a need to model two or three consequences, namely, pool fire, jet fire 
etc. The authors acknowledge the level of complexity that may arise when dealing with 
combination of hazards. The concept presented here are able to capture the synergic 
interactions and model as dependent network. The Petri net model is a combination of 
many sub-networks or sub-models, each one is connected with the help of predicates and 
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assertions. Therefore, the traceability could be maintained while modelling the complex 
sequence of domino accident. 
The DOMINO-GSPN model enables a time-dependent analysis of domino scenarios. This 
analysis would help to prepare better control and mitigation measures. The key advantage 
of this model is that it provides a continuous time-dependent domino effect probability of 
credible scenarios, which could be used for planning and design decision-making purposes. 
The tools like PHAST and ALOHA are powerful in modelling gas dispersion, fuel 
evaporation, and pool fire spreading. These tools are meant for consequence (impact) 
analysis, they have limited ability to analyze domino effect occurrence likelihood and 
most importantly these tools impact assessment is time independent. The present study 
is unique as it attempts to demonstrate domino effect likelihood analysis as function of 
duration of accident (pool fire) using advance probability analysis tool, Petri nets. The 
proposed DOMINO-GSPN model is a generalized model that enable studying accident 
escalation vector which lead to domino effect scenarios. The DOMINO-GSPN model can 
be integrated with PHAST or ALOHA for detailed impact (consequence analysis) of 
domino effect.  
3.6 Conclusions 
In process industries, a large amount of flammable material is stored and/or processed. A 
small incident such as leakage in a processing unit can affect nearby units, resulting in a 
cascading effect, known as the domino effect. Modelling the domino effect is a challenging 
task. This work employs advanced probabilistic techniques to model domino effects; the 
advantages of the proposed method are: 
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• A probabilistic analysis of the accident caused by domino effect provides a time-
dependent risk profile for each level of the domino effect. 
• The domino effect propagation path is modelled as a time-dependent process. 
• The complex interaction among units can be easily depicted using a Petri-net. 
• The failure profile obtained is used to analyze the vulnerability of the unit instead 
of using conventional threshold criteria to determine the next level of domino 
propagation. 
• Combined loading i.e., heat load through different mechanisms is considered. 
This study focused on developing innovative domino effect propagation and likelihood 
model, and also analyzing unit vulnerability based on the two-step criteria (threshold 
criteria and risk profile). For the sake of clarity, a system consists of four atmospheric tanks 
have been analyzed. The results obtained from that model are compared with another 
probabilistic method which has been widely used in the field of safety and risk engineering. 
In comparison to other techniques used to model the domino effect, this novel approach is 
capable of assessing the failure likelihood as time-dependent. Discrete values can only 
provide an evaluation of the system at a particular instant of time, whereas continuous time-
dependent results help to monitor risk, especially in complex systems where domino effect 
accidents are quite common. Other aspects of the domino effect such as overpressure and 
blast waves can also be modelled using the same approach. Past accidents due to the 
domino effect can be easily modelled using the DOMINO-GSPN model, which helps to 
prevent future accidents. Prevention of domino effect accidents results in saving the 
environment, human life and property. This work can be improved by considering the 
89 
 
inventory of tanks as a probability distribution, all the calculations of heat radiation are 
carried out using tank 1 inventory as a constant. Further, wind speed and direction can also 
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4 Summary, Conclusions and Recommendations     
4.1 Summary 
This thesis comprises three main Chapters. The first chapter presents a background of 
dynamic risk analysis methods used in process facilities. It highlights the limitations of 
available methods in QRA for process operations in the industry. The use of BN is widely 
recognized in the area of process safety; however, it has a few deficiencies which have 
been identified as research objective I. Moreover, another accident scenario, known as the 
domino effect, has been identified in the literature. The available modelling techniques are 
inefficient to model the propagation pattern of a combined loading, i.e. incorporating the 
heat intensity from the different mechanism and assess its likelihood as a function of time. 
This problem has been identified as research objective II. The application of a stochastic 
Petri net in the modelling of the domino effect has also been discussed. The second chapter 
proposes a generic framework of a Bayesian network to model the accident scenario under 
uncertainties such as input information (data) and dependency (model). The proposed 
framework shows how to incorporate missing or limited data, aggregate subjective 
knowledge and integrate them into a risk assessment. Evidence theory has been used to 
aggregate the expert judgements to determine the failure probabilities. To address the 
logical dependence of the variables, canonical probabilistic models such as Noisy-OR and 
leaky Noisy-AND gates have been taken into consideration. These logic gates have proven 
to provide median conditions in their respective Boolean logic gates. The third chapter 
describe in detail a novel model based on the stochastic Petri net for probabilistic analysis 
of the domino effect scenario in chemical/process facilities. The DOMINO-GSPN model 
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can capture the propagation pattern of the domino scenarios in the form of Petri nets. The 
graphical demonstration using the places, transitions, directed arcs and tokens helps to 
visualize the patterns of domino effect scenarios. GSPN has the advantage of modelling 
the complex interactions of process units with the help of transitions. The failure profile 
obtained for secondary or higher order units represents the vulnerability of those units as a 
function of time and is used to identify the next level. The most probable configuration of 
the units can also be identified. 
4.2 Conclusions 
The present work illustrates the application of the advanced concept of the Bayesian 
network and stochastic Petri net in the area of process safety and risk assessment. It is 
focused on modelling complex process system and their behaviour by incorporating 
advanced probability theory and algorithms.  This work has developed two novel models 
to i) analyze a single accident using limited imprecise data, and ii) analyze the chain of 
process accidents. Both models are tested using available data and compared with 
published literature. Their application has been verified using past accidents. The first 
developed model has enhanced Bayesian network performance by the including new 
logical relationships with the help of dynamic logic gates, along with incorporating expert 
judgement in determining the failure probabilities of basic events and safety barriers. The 
second model has enabled mathematical representation of the domino effect propagation 
pattern and their likelihood estimate. This work is beneficial for academicians as it provides 
novel methods and models; it is of equally high importance for industry practitioners, as it 
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enables better assessment of dynamic risk. Application of this work would help in 
designing effective safety measures to prevent process accidents. 
4.3 Recommendations 
The present study can be further improved by considering structural uncertainty apart from 
the model and data uncertainty. These uncertainties play an important role in rare event 
scenarios which includes a domino effect analysis. Completeness and incorrectness of data 
especially related to expert opinion is very important. This may be considered in future 
studies. 
Integrating incorrectness or incompleteness of the data in developing the BN model would 
be a reasonable extension of the present work.   
The modelling of the domino effect scenario presented in this study only considers heat 
radiation as an escalation vector. However, the model can be extended to consider more 
than one escalation vector such as overpressure caused by the explosion. Moreover, the 
work can also be improved by considering the inventory of atmospheric tanks as a 
probability distribution rather than as a constant value. Wind speed and direction can also 
be considered to enhance the model to consider a more complex and realistic situation. 
Data and model uncertainty can also be considered in modelling the domino effect. The 
developed model may be integrated with a risk assessment framework. 
The consequence analysis of the domino effect in economic terms will be an obvious 
extension of the present work. The economic consequence assessment could be conducted 
using loss function, which subsequently could be integrated with dynamic risk assessment.  
